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There seems to be almost decade long consensus on what are the key problems in innovations 
systems in Eastern European (EE) countries.2 The consensus runs through social scientists in- 
and outside Eastern Europe to official statements of he European Commission. Briefly, there 
are two key challenges in the innovation systems in Eastern European countries: first, 
mismatch between R&D and education policies on the one hand and industry needs on the 
other (it can be also called a high-technology bias); second, strongly fragmented policy arena 
where coordination problems are rampant. (See for detailed country overviews European 
Commission’s Innovation Trend-Chart, 2006 and 2007; see also Radosevic, 2004 and 2006; 
Reid and Peter, 2008) These problems were partially detected, or their emergence predicted, 
already in late 1990s (see, for instance, Radosevic, 1998 and 1999) and by the 2000s they 
formed the core of European Commission’s message to the new member states on what they 
need to take into account while devising strategic plans for the implementation of EU’s 
structural funding between 2007 and 2013. (for detailed overview, see Kattel, Reinert and 
Suurna, 2009) Yet, over the decade, the problems persist and seem to get worse. This article 
sets out to explore why this is so.  
 
We argue that there are two main reasons. Fir t , what we call copying paradox: EE countries 
have been policy takers from the start in early 1990s; at their core, economic and innovation 
policies have been copied and taken from, at the beginning, from the Washington Consensus 
toolbox and later from the European Union. The innovati n policies in EE have as a result 
been converging with the developed countries’ policies. Yet, we aim to show that this 
convergence in policy is accompanied by hollowing or n n-emergence of local capacity to 
analyse and evaluate domestic policy issues because of de-contextualization of policy making 
through the very same convergence. That is, while EE countries are voluntarily or 
involuntarily increasingly copying and transferring policies from developed countries and 
international organizations, this usually exasperates their problems as local capacity 
development is thwarted. Thus, there is a copying paradox: the more EE countries are 
converging on the policy level (the more ‘mainstream’ policies they choose), the lower their 
actual capacity at development becomes, hence diverging capacities for development. 
 
This paradox is, second, significantly enabled and enhanced by what we call path 
dependencies in the ways innovation systems have developed in EE. More precisely, we aim 
to show that the timing when EE economies rejoined th  global capitalism was highly specific 
in terms policy and academic advice the new economies and their policy makers received. In 
                                                
1 Corresponding author, email: erkki.karo@ttu.ee. Research for this study was partially supported by Estonian 
Ministry of Education and Research (targeted financing grant no SF0140094s08), Estonian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communication (I-PUP grant) and Estonian Science Foundation (grants no 7577, 6703
and 7441). 
2 In the context of this article, Central and Eastern European countries are the following ten most recent member 
states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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fact, the article shows that in addition to initial timing specifics, also the accession into the 
European Union served as an additional element in certifying earlier developments. There are 
two key areas in policy and academic advice EE countries received since early 1990s (and in 
some cases, already during the 1980s): economic and innovation policy and governance. We 
argue that in both fields, early 1990s were a highly particular time in terms of what ideas 
dominated the respective discourses: in the former, Washington Consensus (WC) provided 
the most dominant ideas how to restructure the economy and in the latter, the New Public 
Management (NPM) provided the most dominant ideas how to manage democratic polities. 
While both discourses within and outside EE countries have noticeably evolved during past 
20 years, we aim to show that the initial path determined by these two core ideas (WC and 
NPM) is still fundamental to EE innovation systems and, perversely, the accession into the 
EU has in many ways deepened the path dependencies because the capacity for policy 
development has been thwarted. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we will provide a methodological note that 
explains the framework that we are using to highlight our main proposition of this article 
(existence of the copying paradox) and the reasons for its persistence (path dependency). Our 
approach in this paper is a rather unique one in a sense that we will borrow a lot of conceptual 
ideas and approaches from the public administration and policy discourse (policy 
convergence, policy diffusion, policy transfer etc.) o explain the development of innovation 
policy in a specific context, the EE. Our framework is largely based on the historical 
institutionalist analysis of the innovation policy development. We will use this approach to 
track the trajectory of the development of the innovation policy in EE. Further, we will use it 
as an explanatory tool to explain why despite the perception of policy convergence we can 
witness a divergence in the policy from the intended results and as a result can talk about 
limited and de-contextualised policy-making capacities. In the third part we will provide a 
stylised analysis of the evolution of innovation policy in EE during the last two decades. We 
will also explain why we can witness a perception of policy convergence in innovation, but 
actual capacity divergence in development. In the fourth part, we will discuss how the two 
discourses of innovation policy and public administration have evolved over the past 20 years 
and how they provide highly specific lenses for understanding EE innovation systems and 
thus provide fertile ground for the key problems to remain unsolved. To explain, the third part 
of our paper is analysing policy developments on the level of actions and outcomes and the 
fourth part on the level of talk and decisions (see ction two for an explanation of the need to 
differentiate between the two levels of analysis; al o Pollitt, 2002; 2001). Lastly, in the 
concluding discussion we will provide an summarising explanation why we can witness the 
copying paradox persisting over a considerable pathof e policy development, that is we will 
highlight how the EE countries have moved in their policy-making from a period of 
‘confusion in diffusion’ in 1990s to a period of ‘lost in transfer’ in 2000s without any 
significant increase in the actual policy analysis and policy capacities. 
 
2. Methodological and theoretical approach for the analysis 
 
Before explaining the theoretical and methodological approach we will firstly create a 
framework of analysis that we have used to place our c re assumptions and reasons for the 
approach of this paper (parallel analysis of two distinct discourses) into a traceable frame of 
mind. 
 
Background and framework of analysis 
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As noted, our approach in this paper is a rather unique one in a sense that we will borrow a lot 
of conceptual ideas and approaches from the public administration discourse to explain the 
actual development of innovation policy in a specific context, the EE. We believe that at least 
in the case of policy-making in developing or transition countries this adds value to the 
analysis in two ways. Firstly, we start with a working-hypothesis that in much of the 
theoretical and policy-relevant literature on industrial development and especially innovation 
policy we can witness a rather evident over-generalisation or simplification of the role of 
politics and policy-making. What do we mean, and explain in detail in the following sections, 
is that in most of these approaches there is a line of argumentation that prescribes or offers a 
particular view of the theoretical underpinnings of innovation and summarises it into a policy 
framework or mix (theory based ideal-type models). The actual implementation of the 
proposed ‘policy’ is usually presumed to take place s theorised (e.g., politicians should adopt 
what is prescribed by theories or ideal types) or explained to be dependent on the 
administrative capacity of a specific country or region (e.g., no significant differentiation 
made between political choices over policy and ability to implement policies). We believe 
that innovation policy discourse has much to gain from further elaborating on the role of 
government and governance. Therefore we make a difference between two generic discourses 
– innovation policy (IP), and public policy and administration (PPA) – and try to create added 
value to the academic research by analysing them in parallel.  
 
Secondly, PPA literature is mostly concerned with the issues of policy and administrative 
capacity, that is with how policy decisions are made nd implemented and not so much with 
the theoretical underpinnings of the different policy choices put in front of policy processes.3 
Therefore, the PPA discourse in the context of developing and transition states makes a sort 
of ‘reversed-presumption’ compared to the IP discourse: the PPA discourse does not question 
the theoretical validity and practical suitability of the dominant discourse on innovation put in 
front of the policy-making process. In essence, both PPA and IP discourses assume that the 
other one has got it ‘right’ and neither questions the validity of each others assumptions: IP 
discourse assumes presence of administrative capacity and PPA discourse assumes the 
presence of valid innovation policy choices. Thus, we analyze both discourses in parallel, yet 
our dominant approach comes from the PPA discourse. We will show that the analysis of the 
discourse of PPA will provide us with tools and arguments to explain the resulting path-
dependencies in the IP development and policy results; the parallel analysis of discourses will 
hopefully bring us closer to comprehensively describing and explaining the specific trajectory 
of IP development in EE countries. 
 
Therefore, our analysis is based on one core assumption: in order to analyse particular public 
policy one has to look at both the content of the policy (e.g., what is the perception about the 
main goals and content of innovation or development policy) and the capacity of actually 
achieving the results of the policy (e.g., does the institutional capacity of a particular 
country/context support achieving the defined goals f policy) (see also Painter and Pierre, 
2005a; and for a wider context, Pollitt, 2008). However, we will track this relationship 
between goal-setting and implementation processes on tw  levels: first, actual developments 
on policy and implementation levels (effects level); second, on the level of policy and 
academic ‘talk’ and discourse (process level). In order to so, we use for the first level the 
                                                
3 We argue that at least in the context of transferring policies from more developed to developing countries, the 
contextualisation of policies through policy analysis i  often done through incremental changes within t e 
dominant policy discourse (in our paper WC and NPM). For similar argument placed into policy transfer 
literature, e.g., supply and demand based policy transfer, see Randma-Liiv (2005). 
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concepts of capacity and policy convergence/transfer; for the second level, we use concepts 
from historical institutionalism such as path dependency. 
 
Theoretical and methodological approach 
 
In order to specify the concept of capacity, we distinguish between three levels where 
discussion about the role of the state and public poli ies is of relevance (based on Painter and 
Pierre, 2005b, 2-7):  
 
- The broadest concept can be defined as ‘state capacity’ that means achieving 
appropriate outcomes such as sustainable economic development and welfare (based 
on values such as legitimacy, accountability, compliance, consent). In essence, 
development and innovation policy discourse is refer ing to this level when discussing 
the issues of administrative capacity or capacity of the government to implement 
theoretically sound or ideal-type innovation policies. It can be also viewed as the 
extent and depth of government involvement in the policy area. The public 
administration and policy discourse elaborates on this concept by distinguishing two 
subsidiary concepts (each with its own theoretical and analytical approaches) that are 
both preconditions for the state capacity to emerge: 
- ‘Policy capacity’ refers to ability to make intelligent policy choices (based on values 
such as coherence, public regardingness, credibility, decisiveness, resoluteness); in the 
context of innovation policy, policy capacity refers to the ability of the political 
system to decide upon the best approach (what is ‘desirable’ and what is ‘feasible’) to 
innovation and development;4   
- The level or quality of the policy capacity is depend nt on the third concept, namely 
‘administrative capacity’ that refers to effective resource management (based on 
values such as economy, efficiency, responsibility, probity, equity); this capacity 
refers to the ability of the political system to use its resources for implementing the 
policy choices that have been made. Administrative and policy capacity have to be 
seen as interdependent because institutional memory of a political system that is 
pivotal for making intelligent policy choices is largely stocked both in institutions of 
administration and institutions of policy-making. 
 
This kind of analytical differentiation that we have provided has not been an inherent part of 
developing public policies in transition countries, such as the EE countries. The transition 
from the communist to the democratic societies has created the overwhelming challenge to 
look at once at all of these levels and create/reform/develop these capacities: the EE countries 
have had to reform and restructure their core institutions in parallel with introducing new 
policies. This has been a recognised task both at te level of public administration and policy 
(Agh, 2003; Verheijen, 2003; Aslund, 2002) and innovation and development (Radosevic, 
2009; Tiits et al., 2008; Török, 2007). We will argue that this has been a considerable 
challenge precisely because the EE countries have “looked up” towards so called benchmark 
regions and institutions (the EU, the OECD, World Bank, IMF) and the lessons that the EE 
countries have been given and what they have themselves taken over (transferred) are rather 
                                                
4 For instance, the theoretical approached for technological catch-up and development can be divided into 
several opposing theoretical models e.g. from neoclassical to Schumpeterian/evolutionary/institutional schools 
(for more comprehensive overview see for example Nelson and Winter, 1982). In this context, the ideal-type 
policy mixes (e.g., the actual range of policy choies that could theoretically be made) for innovation and 
catching-up that the EE countries could have considered range from ‘import substitution’-type policies to WC-
based models to post-WC-based/EU-led approaches (for an excellent overview, see Radosevic, 2009).  
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generalised and de-contextualised, that is the policy development has not been substantive 
policy learning but often “fast-and-furious” copying of a specific policy discourse. By 
elaborating on the development of these three levels, the path dependency of the initial 
choices and their impact of unexpected results will hopefully become explicit. In the context 
of EE innovation policy development, we will try to track the development of these three 
levels of capacity since 1990. 
 
Further, our analysis utilizes the policy convergence approach (see, e.g., Bennet, 1991; 
Drezner, 2001; Heichel et al., 2005; Knill, 2005) that analyses the possible tendencies towards 
convergence of national policies in the sense of ‘development of similar or even identical 
policies across countries over time’ (Knill, 2005, 1), or ‘the tendency of societies to grow 
more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances’ (Kerr, 1983), 
or ‘any increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. 
policy objectives, policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political 
jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over given period 
of time.’ (Knill, 2005, 5) These processes are perceived to take place due to globalisation, 
Europeanization and other influences.  
 
Policy convergence can be viewed as an umbrella concept to concepts or notions such as 
isomorphism,5 policy transfer,6 and policy diffusion7 (see Knill, 2005). These concepts, 
especially policy transfer and policy diffusion, have grown in importance in the context of the 
transition in EE countries. The different notions exemplify that policy convergence in the 
form of taking over policies from other contexts and countries can happen in different ways 
(voluntarily or involuntarily; consciously or more or less unconsciously etc.). 
 
Thus, the policy convergence and its related concepts shed light to the analytical levels that 
can be used for analysing the convergence trends as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overview of policy convergence. 
 
 Policy convergence Isomorphism Policy transfer Policy diffusion 
Analytical focus Effects Effects Process Process 













and transfer process 
Adoption patterns 
Source: Knill, 2005.  
 
Therefore we can see that there is a distinct difference between effects and processes within 
the context of policy convergence: similar process may and may not lead to similar effects or 
                                                
5 Isomorphism is defined as a process of homogenization that “forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditi s“ (Knill, 2005, 5; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, 66). 
Pollitt (2001) distinguishes between coercive, mimet c and normative types of isomorphism. 
6 Policy transfer is a „process by which knowledge about policies, administrat ve arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system“ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000, 5). 
7 Policy diffusion refers to processes that might result in increasing policy similarities across countries hence 
leading to policy convergences. Though there are two different approaches to diffusion – it can be either 
described as the spread of policies independent of causal factors (e.g. it can be both voluntary and coercive) or it 
can be defined through voluntary adoption (as opposed to coercive) of different policies. (Knill, 2005, 3) In our 
paper we look at the diffusion in the more flexible sense allowing it to be caused by broad range of causal 
factors. 
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outcomes and similar effects may or may not be the result of similar processes or policies 
with similar characteristics. This differentiation we believe offers significant explanatory 
weight in discussing the policy reforms of transition/or catching-up countries. In our 
categorisation, policy diffusion describes mediated or managed spread of new policies and 
ideas that does not reflect conscious or intended learning or transfer from other context. 
Policy transfer on the other hand describes a policy-making process that reflects more 
conscious analysis of and learning from the experience of other regions and countries.8 
 
By the term of ‘copying paradox’9 we claim that one can witness a policy convergence 
towards WC and NPM based policy approaches both in eco omic and innovation policy and 
in public administration and policy. This convergenc  is perceived to be happening in relation 
to the general ‘mainstream’ models in both of these strands that are presumed to be, on the 
one hand, ideal-type models of transition and economic development and, at the same time, to 
some extent also models that are the foundation of the economic growth and development in 
Western democracies. But, at the same time we argue and analyse in detail below that in EE 
there is a clear divergence in capacities (e.g., capa ity for devising and implementing policies 
for sustainable economic development) compared to the results predicted by these ideal-type 
models and growth models showed by these Western democracies. Therefore, despite 
seemingly following or converging towards the ideal-type policy models, the EE countries are 
diverging in the results and capacities that are being achieved. 
 
The lack of empirical findings of actual convergenc is a well noted challenge faced by the 
convergence analyses. One of the opposing strands of theorising, the ‘new-insitutionalist’ 
studies of institutional and policy development, provides modifying or often challenging 
explanations to the convergence analysis (for a gret overview, see Peters, 2005). These 
approaches emphasise the importance of different insti utional variables (organisational 
structure, value systems, historical experiences etc.) that influence the path of development of 
public administration systems and policies and therefore we can witness more divergence than 
convergence across different contexts. Therefore, the context has always an important 
influence on the desirability and feasibility of implementing certain policies. Yet, in the 
pursuit of creating analytical models, providing generalisations and explicit policy advice, the 
importance of context and the relevance of history seem to be the issues most easily 
disregarded or not taken as relevant (for an excellent analysis, see Pollitt, 2008). We believe 
that parallel discussion of the emergence and development of IP and PPA discourses in this 
context will help us explain why we can witness the ‘copying paradox’. 
 
Therefore, we use the ‘new-institutionalist’ theoris to analyse the emergence and 
development of the phenomena that we have depicted as the ‘copying-paradox’. For tracking 
the trajectories of policy development over time and explaining changes or persistence of 
specific models and paths of development, the ‘new-institutionalist’ school offers ‘historical 
institutionalism’ as a tool for analysis (see Pierson, 2004). The starting point of this approach 
is the claim ‘the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when policy is 
initiated, will have continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the 
future.’ (Peters, 2005, 71) Therefore, we talk about ‘path-dependencies’ in institutional 
                                                
8 For great literature review and discussion in the context of developing/transition countries, see Savi (2007). 
9 In the policy transfer and policy convergence litera ure the term ‘copying’ is differentiated from concepts such 
as ‘emulation’ , ‘combination’ , ‘inspiration’ to reflect a more conscious duplication of policies (for overview and 
explanation, see Savi, 2007). In our approach, ‘opying’ in the concept ‘copying paradox’ implies a lack of 
conscious and contextual policy analysis capacity that would result in more contextual modifications of 
innovation policy and therefore we argue that there is a general tendency towards copying rather than modifying. 
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development and in public policy-making. Yet, this as to be seen as a tendency and not a 
rule of thumb, for instance if the prevalence of path dependencies would be a universal 
phenomena, it would be futile to use this approach for assessing possibilities for fundamental 
transformations and changes of institutions and policies (Pollitt, 2008). Therefore, we use this 
approach to highlight the instances – critical junctures or punctuations – where fundamental 
changes in institutions and policies have or could have taken place, e.g. the instances where 
the tendencies towards path-dependency are potentially superseded by other factors. Also, we 
will use the approach to argue that by looking at the historical development trajectory of the 
IP from the perspective of the EE since its emergence (beginning of the 1990s), we can see 
that the changes of policy in essence reflect percetionally significant, but still within a path 
changes – cycles/alternations – of the policy. 
 
Therefore, the lens of ‘historical institutionalism’ provides both theoretical and analytical 
arguments to explain why we can witness contradictory tendencies of both seemingly 
converging policies and diverging outcomes in policy and policy-making capacity.  
 
Further, from the historical institutionalist strand we can derive another tool that can be used 
for clarifying the level of analysis in discussions of policy convergence. The convergence as 
such can be divided into four layers that have different implications on policy development 
and on our understanding of convergence (Pollitt, 2002, 2001): discursive convergence, .g. 
convergence at the level of talk; decisional convergence, .g. convergence at the level of 
public decisions over policy, technique, organisational form; practice convergence, .g. 
convergence on the level of working practices or policy mixes used; results convergence, .g. 
the level where reforms and policies produce their intended (and unintended) effects so that 
the outputs and outcomes begin to converge. The former two are more in line with the process 
level analysis and the latter two with more effects level analysis. The empirical proofs of the 
policy development both in PPA discourse (for overview see, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) 
and IP discourse (for latest overview, see Box, 2009) are largely limited to the process level 
analysis (e.g., analysing official governmental statements, policy documents, other public 
declarations, formal decisions and programs etc.). In the context of developing and transition 
countries this limited understanding of discourse and policy development has huge 
implications for policy transfer processes, and would seemingly logically create an essential 
need for elaborate capacities of contextual policy-analysis. 
 
By looking together at the IP and PPA discourse we can highlight that the development of the 
innovation policy trajectories has depended on the specific development paths of each of the 
discourses. In the following section we will describe the effects level convergence of the 
innovation policy in EE, that is, we will provide a stylised description of the innovation policy 
development in EE and indicating how it has resulted in the ‘copying paradox’. This will be 
followed by a discussion how innovation policy emerged and developed from specific 
discourses of IP and PPA that were largely based on pr cess level convergence into policy 
models that lack empirical proof of success in at le st developing country context. Then, we 
will discuss our findings in the historical-institutional framework to highlight how the 
discursive convergence of IP and PPA since the 1990s has locked the EE policies into a 
distinct path of development (the path dependency) that is becoming increasingly more 
difficult to break from.  
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Table 2 summarizes our approach to analyzing innovation policy from public policy and 
administration perspective. To put it into the context of ‘typical’ innovation policy analysis, 
our approach looks at the level of how innovation systems10 are governed and managed. 
 
Table 2. The levels and nature of analysis of innovati n policy from the public policy and 
administration perspective. 
 
 Effects level Process level 
Unit of analysis Policies implemented, their impact 
on the real economy and innovation 
system 
Discourses and policy choices in 
and around innovation system 
Patterns of analysis Levels of capacity (state, policy 
and administrative) 
Levels of convergence (discursive 
and process) 
Results of analysis Tracing the changes in capacity 
(increasing, decreasing; 
contextualised, de-contextualised) 
and innovation systems 
Identification of critical junctures 
and path dependencies 
 
The effects level is analysed in sector 3; the process level in section 4. 
 
3. Evolution of innovation policy in Eastern Europe since 1990 
 
From the existing scientific and policy analytical literature we can distil two fundamental 
problems that persist in the innovation systems of EE countries since a decade if not for a 
longer period.11 First , in most EE countries there is a long-standing and strong mismatch 
between R&D and education system outcomes and industry needs. This mismatch has in turn 
two mutually enforcing aspects: one the one hand, innovation policies in EE tend to focus on 
high technology (for instance, commercialization of R&D results, technology parks, 
incubators, etc); on the other hand, actual economic and industrial structure is characterized 
by low productivity growth and dominated by outsourcing activities with very low demand 
for R&D or indeed for most outcomes targeted by innovation policies. Second, in most EE 
countries innovation policies suffer from double fragmentation: on the one hand, there is a 
strong fragmentation and divide between various actors in the innovation system (universities, 
companies, governments); on the other hand, also within the public sector fragmentation 
between various policy areas (education, industry, energy etc) is strong. Such double 
fragmentation leads to massive and systematic coordination failures in policy design, 
implementation and evaluation. Clearly, the two challenges are connected and enforcing each 
other. In this section, however, we intend to show  these challenges originate from the 
application of Washington Consensus policy toolbox to EE economies and while the 
European Union recognized and emphasised these problems throughout the accession talks 
and during the negotiations for implementation of EU’s structural funding in 2000s, EU’s 
influence has, perversely, enforced or even deepened these challenges. 
                                                
10 We use innovation systems here in a rather generic meaning as a system of actors and features that determine, 
in the broadest sense of the word, how and why companies innovate; see Freeman, 1987; Lundvall 1992; and 
Nelson 1993. 
11 See for detailed country overviews European Commission’s Innovation Trend-Chart, 2006 and 2007; see also 
Radosevic, 2004 and 2006; Reid and Peter, 2008; and K ttel, Reinert and Suurna, 2009. Best research on t e EE 




We show below that the ‘original sin’ for the long-standing and systemic problems in EE 
innovations systems was misunderstanding the nature of Soviet R&D system and industry. 
This misunderstanding, as we will show in the next section, was largely caused by the timing 
of re-entry of EE countries into global economy, and later we will argue that policies based on 
this misunderstanding can be seen as the ‘critical juncture’ in creating the specific path-
dependency in the innovation policy development in EE.
 
Restructuring Soviet R&D system and industry  
 
At the end of the 1980s, Eastern European and former Soviet economies were generally 
highly industrialized and many of these economies wre seemingly on a similar 
industrialization and growth path as the East Asian economies. According to the World Bank 
data, countries like Estonia, Latvia and Hungary were ahead of Korea during in the early 
1980s in terms of industrial value added per capita. (World Bank WDI online database) 
However, the industrialization of EE countries was widely understood to be highly artificial 
and ineffective, using in other words excessive amounts of resources and other inputs to 
produce goods. Thus, after regaining the independence, restructuring the economy and in 
particular the industry, was on top of the agenda for all EE countries. In fact, in many ways 
what was desired was not so much restructuring as outright replacement of old Soviet 
industry with one similar to the Western industries. 
 
Washington Consensus policies, coming to full articulation and force around the same time, 
late 1980s and early 1990s, offered a very coherent and relatively simple set of policies to 
deliver the restructuring and replacement. Rodrik offers an interesting summary of what the 
Washington Consensus original was and how it changed during the 1990s into an augmented 
version. (Table 3) 
 
Table 3. Washington Consensus and Augmented Washington Consensus. 
 
Source: Rodrik, 2006, 978. 
 
Interestingly, Williamson’s original list of policies that Washington can agree upon, included 
infant industry protection, and ‘a moderate general tariff (in the range of 10 percent to 20 
percent, with little dispersion) might be accepted as a mechanism to provide a bias toward 
diversifying the industrial base without threatening serious cost’. (2002) While both belong 
arguably to classical canon of industrial policy and form mandatory passage points in 
industrialization and upgrading efforts (Reinert, 2007), neither made it into the Washington 
Consensus practices in the 1990s or into its augmented version of the 2000s. 
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For EE countries, however, only the original list (1-10 in Rodrik’s table) is relevant. While all 
EE countries set out to implement WC-inspired reforms (see also Radosevic, 2009), 
Drahokoupil (2007, 90) offers a very interesting way how to group different strategies 
followed by EE countries in 1990s: ‘The competition states in the Visegrád four can be call d 
Porterian, aiming at attracting strategic FDI through targeted subsidies … The Baltic 
competition states can be called macroeconomic stability-driven neoliberal states with 
monetary institutions at their core. … Finally, Slovenia has developed a distinct type of 
competition state, which can be characterized as a bal nced neo-corporatist.’ However, as 
Weissenbacher (2007, 71) argues, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia had experiences of 
dealing with IMF already during 1980s when they borrowed money from it and applied 
standard austerity programs. Thus, while there are clearly differences in accents, the general 
framework offered by WC was applied in all EE countries throughout the 1990s and indeed 
the policy sets were converging during the 1990s. (Drahokoupil, 2007)  
 
Indeed, WC-inspired policies were considered by most EE countries as the innovation and 
industrial policy measures and in essence there werno other policy initiatives during 1990s. 
During this period, almost all of economic policy capacity building was directed towards 
macro-economic competencies (at central banks, ministries of finance, also think tanks). This 
was greatly helped by the advice and assistance from the Washington institutions such the 
World Bank and IMF, but also from OECD. Innovation policy was considered as secondary 
to transition related concerns (Mickiewicz and Radosevic, 2001, 10). As there were no 
innovation policies proper, there was also essentially no institution building for or in the 
innovation systems. WC-inspired policies were understood to deliver the economic stability 
to attract foreign direct investments that should become vehicles of delivering actual 
restructuring and replacement of Soviet industry. In other words, market demand was 
understood to deliver economic restructuring and along with it create also a need and 
direction for innovation system reform (R&D, education systems, labour policy etc). Building 
up capacity in specific areas of innovation systems seemed superfluous; indeed, R&D system 
was seen in many ways as too big (employing too many people) and ineffective (too far from 
the private sector). (Radosevic 1998 and 1999 offer good overviews)  
 
Thus, market discipline in form of WC-inspired policies replaced actual capacity building; 
market was seen the producer of priorities. Indeed, this is perhaps the most important feature 
of WC: as it presupposed that all development problems are fundamentally alike (be it in 
Africa or Russia), it took away the burden of domestic capacity building and evaluation, and 
replaced it with a set of universal policies. This is directly the opposite to previous 
development consensus; as one of the classical developm nt economists Hirschman argues, 
all development presupposes some form of priority se ting through policy making. 
(Hirschman 1958) The Washington Consensus did away ex ctly with this assumption: since 
all development problems are assumed to be of the sam  nature, the solutions are bound to be 
the same as well, and this takes the burden of proof, s  to say, away from domestic policy-
making. (See further Kattel, Kregel and Reinert 2009) 
 
However, it can be argued that for EE countries, the WC-based policies also created a 
relatively strong legitimization of newly written constitutions and laws, and for policy process 
based on these. Precisely because the impetus of reform was coming from the outside, these 
reforms were somewhat safe from being questioned than home-grown initiatives would have 
been. At the same time the legitimacy of the state or the understanding of the state capacity 
was highly reflective of the WC ideas resulting in no-policy policies in innovation and 
industrial policy areas; the existing policy measure  where more in line with supporting or 
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creating market forces than steering or managing the market for sustainable transition and 
catching-up, that has been a more traditional approach f developing countries throughout the 
past. 
 
In reality, the Washington Consensus policies were even too effective in destroying the old 
industrial structure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most EE and other former Soviet 
economies saw deep dives in their growth rates and in industry as well as service sector value 
added. It took more than a decade for most EE countries to reach the growth and development 
levels of 1990 (see further Tiits et al, 2008). This is particularly so in the case of former 
Soviet republics. According the World Bank’s (2006) calculations, the recession many former 
Soviet republics (e.g., Ukraine) experienced during 1990s, and are still experiencing, is worse 
than the Great Depression in the USA and the World War II in Western Europe (in both cases, 
recovery was considerably quicker). 
 
This cognitive dissonance between promise of reforms and actual developments was caused 
by one of the most striking features of post-Soviet development in the 1990s: the rapid 
primitivization of industrial enterprises or even the outright destruction of many previously 
well-known and successful companies. This happened because of the way Soviet industrial 
companies and the industry in general was built up and ran in a complex web of planning and 
competition. (Radosevic 1998) A sudden opening of the markets and abolition of capital 
controls made these industrial companies extremely vulnerable. The partially extreme vertical 
integration that was the norm in such companies meant th t if one part of the value chain ran 
into problems due to the rapid liberalization, it easily brought down the entire chain or 
complex. However, foreign companies seeking to privatize plants were almost always 
interested in only part of the value-chain (a specific production plant, infrastructure or 
location) and thus privatization turned into publicly led attrition of companies and jobs (see 
Frost and Weinstein, 1998; Young, 1994). 
 
Such a drastic change made it relatively easy to actually replace Soviet industry: with the 
macroeconomic stability and liberalization of markets, followed by a rapid drop in wages, 
many former Soviet economies became increasingly attractive as privatization targets and 
outsourcing of production. Indeed, one of the most fundamental characteristics of EE industry 
(and services) since 1990 has been that the majority of companies have engaged in process 
innovation (e.g., in the form of acquisition of new machinery and mastery of production 
capabilities) in seeking to become more and more cost-effective in the new market place. 
(Tiits et al, 2008) 
 
Perversely mirroring the above-described cluster-like characteristic of Soviet industrial 
activities, the Soviet R&D system was based on similar vertical integration of R&D into 
specialized institutions: ‘Under socialism, most technical change was pushed from one 
institutional sector … which was essentially a grouping of R&D institutes and other related 
activities … This sector involved in activities farbeyond R&D including design, engineering 
and often trouble-shooting activities.’ (Radosevic, 1999, 282) These institutions were usually 
also the originators and carriers of patents and forms of intellectual property rights. (Ibid., 
285) This means that the Soviet-style R&D system had very low level of company in house 
R&D. (Radosevic, 1998, 80-81) Industrial conglomerat s were effectively cut off from 
various potential learning and feedback loops; production and actual innovation (in particular 
in form of new products and processes) took place in different institutions, both however 




The once complex engineering, designing or similar tasks very rapidly replaced by 
significantly more simpler commodified support activities as many companies were wiped 
out, privatized or restructured. The former R&D institutes could have played key role in 
bridging academic research with industry needs as they were essentially the only existing link 
between the two. With the collapse of the institutes system, the link between academy-
industry became, as Radosevic suspected in 1998, the weakest link in the EE R&D system. 
(1998, 90) Indeed, in ‘conditions of high uncertainty and prolonged privatz ion, the 
intangible assets and know-how of industrial institutes, primarily embodied in R&D groups, 
probably erodes much faster than production skills in industry.’ (1998, 100) 
 
Massive onslaught of FDI, in particular since the second half of 1990s and privatization of 
enterprises gave foreign enterprises key role in industrial restructuring and innovation. This, 
in turn, only reinforced severing of linkages between former R&D institutes and enterprise 
sector. (See also Radosevic, 1999, 297) 
 
In particular when compared to East Asia’s developments over the same period, EE transition 
in 1990s is in many ways a lost decade in terms of basic R&D indicators. In Figures 1-4, 
South Korea is used as a proxy for East Asian countries and Mexico for Latin America. The 
Figures show that EE countries converge with Latin American trends and not with East Asian 
ones. 
 
Figure 1.  General Expenditure on Research and Developm nt as % of GDP, 1990-2006. 
 
 
Source: OECD database. 
 
The decrease in GERD from 1990 onwards until the end of the decade coincides, as we will 
show below, with big divide in EE innovation policies. With the beginning of the accession 
negotiations and increasing funding from the EU, EE countries’ investments into R&D start 
to increase while the preceding decades mirrors the ideas of Washington Consensus policies 
that market initiatives (also in form of R&D investments) are more important and efficient 
than public sector intervention. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate very similar tendencies in patent applications and scientific 
publications in EE compared to East Asia and Latin America. While EE and Latin America 
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are more or less flat-lining since 1990 or 1985 respectively, South Korea development is 
qualitatively highly different. 
 




Source: OECD database. 
 




Source: World Bank WDI Online database. 
 
Against this background the significance of rapid increase in high technology exports in EE 
countries becomes more clear (Figure 4). In high tec nology exports EE and Latin America 




Figure 4. High technology exports as % of all manufctured exports, 1988-2006. 
 
 
Source: World Bank WDI Online database. 
 
Yet, dissonance between disintegrating R&D system, much slower catching up pace and 
rapidly growing high tech exports is perhaps the best indicator how importantly the change in 
the global production networks and in particular the rise of outsourcing production changed 
the perception of what is happening in EE countries. While exports indicate high growth in 
high technology areas, all other indicators show that is is largely an illusion based on 
deception created by outsourcing. What is statistically captured as high technology product 
may in reality be very different in nature: it can be touch screens for iPhones or it can be 
assembled mobile phones for any brand mobile producer. Both show up as high technology 
statistics, yet the former is a product at the beginning of its life cycle and the latter has clearly 
reached maturity. Indeed, when iPhone was introduce in 2007, Balda AG was the only 
company in the world able to produce high number of innovative touch displays used by 
Apple in iPhones. (Business Week, 2007) This is manifestly not the case in mobile phone 
assembly as such. Thus, even if high technology exports have been growing in developing 
countries such as EE, this does not mean that we deal with similarly dynamic sectors with 
significant increasing returns. (See also Krugman, 2008a) However, this deceptive picture 
created an image of EE countries as quickly catching up to developed countries and also that 
this catching up is based on high-tech exports. Consequently, the focus of innovation policies 
should be to intensify R&D content of exports. This is precisely what the EU set out to do in 
2000s. 
 
Thus, we can sum up the key features of EE innovatin systems before the accession into the 
EU as follows: 
 
- Privatization programs and other measures to attract foreign direct investments; 
- Emphasis on macro-economic stability; 
- Erosion and partial disintegration of the previous Soviet R&D system; 
- Prevalence of macro-economic policy skills; 
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- Market demand as key force of restructuring and reform of innovation system. 
 
The development of innovation policy capacities canbe viewed in following terms: 
 
- Relatively strong but peculiar state capacity as WCinspired policies offered 
legitimacy to new initiatives and policies; 
- This was accompanied by weak to non-existent policy capacity development; EE 
countries act as policy takers and adopt massively from WC toolbox; 
- Policy networking, coordination and cooperation were almost completely ignored; 
- Policy capacity and administrative capacity development substituted by market 
reforms as market demand seen as key driver of changes i  industry and innovation 
system. 
 
Europeanization of innovation policy in EE since 199812 
 
While EU’s importance for EE countries economic policies was visible already during early 
1990s, the change that increased EU’s impact considerably was the beginning of accession 
talks with most EE countries in 1998 and later. Indee , Havlik et al. (2001) argue that the 
adoption of the EU’s acquis communautaire has had a much stronger impact on the 
modernization of EE industry than official (often rudimentary) innovation policy during 
1990s. The introduction of new regulation (usually with significantly higher safety, health and 
other standards) meant that EE industry “was forced to choose whether to modernize their 
products and production facilities rather drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with 
bigger players with greater economies of scale, or to close down altogether”. (See Tiits et al 
2008, 76-77) However, while harmonization with European standards is a distinct driver of 
changes in the private sector and also in legal infrastructure, it is also important to note that 
such harmonization made outsourcing and relocation of production much easier. In essence, 
on the one hand, the harmonization process was a continuation of restructuring processes that 
started during the previous period and were even sig ificantly enforced. On the other hand, 
through so-called pre-structural funding and its management, many EE countries started to 
develop first strategic documents and policies related to innovation and R&D proper.  
 
However, similarly to WC-inspired reforms in 1990s, harmonization process was seen largely 
as a further legitimization of EE’s path. Thus, theend itself – accession to the EU – became 
much more important than what and how was being harmonized. Due to considerable self-
imposed time pressure – harmonizing the legal infrastructure and preparing for accession in 6 
years – meant that adoption of EU’s legal infrastructure was done hastily and without much 
attention to local context. (PHARE Consolidated Summary Report, 2004; PHARE Consolidated 
Summary Report, 2007; see also Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Goetz, 2001). 
 
There were two main vehicles of harmonization: PHARE funding mechanism and later pre-
structural funding. PHARE was launched in 1989 as EU’s financial instrument to assist the 
EE countries (initially only Hungary and Poland) in their political and economic transition 
from a centralised communist system to a decentralised liberal democratic system. In its 
initial phase, PHARE remained a project-based financial assistance scheme: it paid for inputs, 
rather than for results in terms of effective adoption and implementation of the Acquis. 
(Martens, 2001: 37; Grabbe, 2006: 80-81) As PHARE was reformed profoundly during 
1990s, also the grasp of the EU became stronger: 1) PHARE was expanded to additional 11 
                                                
12 This sub-section builds on Kattel, Reinert and Suurna, 2009. 
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countries eligible for support, and 2) PHARE’s goal as the EU’s main financial instrument for 
support changed considerably: away from transition ssues and economic restructuring 
towards support of the accession process. (Martens, 2000; Martens, 2001; Bailey and Propris, 
2004)  
 
In the late 1990s, due to the progressive decentralization of the PHARE management structures 
as well as EU requirement for creation of regional and local institutions to administer the EU 
funds after the accession, a system of implementatio  gencies/administrative agents linked to 
the National Funds was created and pursued in EE (EC Regulation 1266/99; Commission 
Decision on the Review of the PHARE Guidelines for the period 2000-2006; Grabbe, 2006: 
82). This marks the first step in EE towards managig economic policy, and thus innovation 
and industrial restructuring in a distinctly different manner from the previous period where 
the free market and external forces were seen as key drivers of change. However, it also 
important to see that these newly established agencies are mostly for managing external 
funding, policy creation and respective capacity building plays almost no role in these 
agencies. The compartmentalized and structured nature of EU support (PHARE Consolidated 
Summary Report, 2007) on the one hand, and from the 1990s inherited lack of tradition of 
partnership and inter-institutional coordination and cooperation between administrative levels 
on the other hand, meant that most positive effects of such agencies were not reaped and that 
they created in some cases more difficulties and problems than they solved (ESPON, 2005). 
 
In sum, in many ways the harmonization with the EU rules is a period where policies 
supported the restructuring of the industry that began in 1990s under the Washington 
Consensus policies; on the other hand, during this period EU’s influence on funding and 
administrative schemes brought creation of novel governance structures that play up to today 
key part in innovation policy in EE. Therefore, we can see this shift as a continuation of 
development of the WC-based state capacity that is l rgely equated with or seen as sufficient 
for policy capacity, and supplemented with managerial attention to administrative capacity. 
 
However, if we look at what Radosevic calls ‘national innovation capacities’ then these were 
by 2000 clearly underdeveloped in all EE countries compared to the ‘old’ member states. 
(Figure 5; Radosevic 2004) 
 
Figure 5. National Innovation Capacity (NIC) index for EU member states, 2000.13 
                                                
13 The index is built from 4 sub-indexes that are in turn based on following data (in parenthesis): Absorptive 
capacity (Expenditures in education in % of GDP; S&E graduates (% 20–29 population); Population with 3rd 
level education; Participation in life-long learning; Employment medium/high-tech manufacturing; Employment 
high-tech services); R&D supply (Public R&D expenditures (% GDP); Business R&D expenditures (% GDP); 
R&D personnel per labour; EPO high-tech patents; USPTO high-tech patens; Resident patents per capita); 
Diffusion (Training enterprises as % of all enterprises; CVT in % of labour costs of all enterprises; ISO 9000 
certifications per per capita; Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants; PC per 100 inhabitants; ICT expenditures (% 
GDP); Demand (Stock market capitalization in % GDP; omestic credit provided by banking sector; Share of 
FDI in GDP; Share of trade in GDP; Index of patent rights; Registered unemployment). (Radosevic 2004)  
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Source: Based on Radosevic 2004. 
 
Thus, the disintegration of the R&D system that began with the transition was still in full 
force during the harmonization period. And while it can be argued that by 2000, the EE 
economies and in particular their innovation capacities grouped these countries into two 
groups of stronger and weaker performers (Radosevic 2004: 660), most EE economies start to 
recover from the transition losses by 2000. However, in particular with increasing flows of 
FDI into EE and growing high technology exports, the recovering was interpreted as 
imminent catching up or convergence with the ‘old’ Europe. This misconception became the 
key driver of innovation policies in EE from 2004 onwards. 
 
While harmonization with the EU legal infrastructure was important both in terms of actual 
changes it brought to industry and in terms of policy implementation/administrative agencies 
that were created to manage EU’s financial help, the key changes in innovation policy proper 
came with EU structural funding14 that started in 2004 and is set to continue at least until 
2013. Indeed, as we will see below, the EU structural f nding significantly changed both the 
policy content and implementation. However, as we will also see below, key problems that 
emerged during the harmonization period (low networking, weak coordination and significant 
cooperation problems) have been in fact deepened during the current period. 
 
The key content for many innovation policy initiatives in EE emerging with after the 
accession was the underlying assumption that similarly to ‘old’ European countries, also the 
new members need to overcome the so-called ‘European paradox’ (good basic research, low 
commercialization of the research results).15 This is mostly due to miscued policy transfer 
from the EU to the member states. (See also INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 
and 2007) Accordingly, innovation and R&D policies merging in EE in mid 2000s were rife 
with linear understanding of innovation. Innovation s seen as something close to science and 
invention, and that there is a more or less linear cor espondence between scientific discovery 
and high innovation performance; and that innovations behave like Nokia’s mobile phones 
and thus search for the latter became the holy grail of EE innovation policy. Thus, EE 
innovation policies emerging in early and mid 2000s tend to concentrate on high technology 
sectors, on commercializing university research, technology parks for start-ups and similar 
                                                
14 For a general overview, see the EU’s official homepage for structural funding, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm.  
15 An excellent discussion of the paradox is Dosi, Llerena and Labini 2005. 
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efforts. (Radosevic 2002, 355; Radosevic & Reid, 2006, 297; also INNO-Policy TrendChart 
Country Reports 2006 and 2007 for comprehensive overviews of EE countries’ policies and 
challenges) In contents, overwhelming number of policy measures concentrate upon 
innovation programmes and technology platforms. (Reid and Peter, 2008) At the same time, 
the EE emerging innovation policies are characterized by their horizontal nature: policy 
measures typically do not specify sectors but are rthe  open too all sectors. (See Figure 6) 
Arguably, this has to do with they way EE policy makers understood EU state aid regulations 
(Reid and Peter, 2008). We argue that this has to do with both general neo-liberal outlook 
inherited from the 1990s (i.e., market demand is seen as key driver for R&D system) carried 
by most EE policy makers by early 2000s and also their particular skills that concentrated into 
macro-economic area. (See also Drahokoupil, 2007)  
 




Source: Based on Reid and Peter 2008. 
 
Figure 6 also shows that EE countries have typically significantly more innovation policy 
measures than EU15 (especially if deflated by the siz  of respective economies). This can be 
interpreted as growing fragmentation of the policy arena between multitude of measures and 
implementation/administrative agencies. 
 
In addition, as majority of EE measures are financed through EU structural funds, these 
instruments are mostly competition and project based. These aspects – project based 
implementation, multitude of horizontal measures – point to high fragmentation of the entire 
innovation policy field as well as to lack of policy priorities or the ability to set the latter. It is 
also evidence of the strongly market-driven understanding of innovation that is at odds with 
underlying assumption that innovation policies need to alleviate the ‘European paradox’. That 
is, typical EE innovation policy measure aims to commercialize a certain R&D result, 
typically in an high-tech area, but the result and thus the initiative has to come from the 
market. This, however, has scarcely any justifications in reality: first, EE R&D systems and 
their performance disintegrated heavily during 1990s and fell noticeably behind East Asia; 
                                                
16 Sector-specific are policy instruments that deal with one sector (e.g. biotechnology) only; horizontal measures 
are allocated to multiple sectors or do not specify an  sector at all. See for details Reid and Peter 2008. 
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second, this was complemented by the strong specializat on into low-end of various value-
chains meaning that the demand for R&D and skills remain relatively low. 
 
In terms of implementation, the trend initiated during the harmonization period through 
creation of financial and management agencies has been intensified with the structural funds. 
(See INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007 for an overview) It is fair to 
say that the problems with these agencies that started during the harmonization period are 
partially deepened since 2004. Indeed, it can be argued that most problems summarized above 
in EE innovation policies, go in one way or other back to the institutional framework of 
agencies. Almost all EE innovation policy implementation problems go back to very weak 
and disorganised actors, coordination problems are rampant in policy design and 
implementation (see also Radosevic 2002, 355). On the one hand, there is a clear separation 
of policy responsibility between education/science and innovation/industry on the ministerial 
level and its delivery system (Nauwelaers and Reid, 2002, 365; also see INNO-Policy 
TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007). On the ot r hand, this kind of fragmented 
policy-making system has in its turn resulted in the lack of inter-linking and cooperation 
between different innovation-related activities and ctors such as research organisations, 
government and industry (see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports 2006 and 2007).  
 
While the creation and role of innovation policy agencies is in very positive terms praised by 
the official European Innovation Progress Report (2006, 65), we argue that precisely this 
agencification is at the root of many EE innovation policy problems. But the problem as such 
are not so much problems of agencification recognised n the mainstream research in the field 
(Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt, 2005; Christensen and Laegerid, 2005 and 2006; Verhoest and 
Bouckaert, 2005). We argue that the agencification pr cess has not only brought about 
autonomy, coordination, regulation and control problems between ministries and agents. 
More importantly, because agencification emerged in a context of market-forces-driven 
policy framework, the problem is firstly policy-related and only thereafter managerial. What 
do we mean is that the no-policy period of innovation policy was based on lacking policy 
capacity in innovation policy and the following period has largely neglected the issue of 
policy capacity and mainly concentrated upon developing administrative capacity. Therefore, 
even if administrative capacity is increased, contextual policy capacity as such has been 
neglected, or if looked outside the borders of the WC-based state capacity limits, even 
decreased. 
 
Thus, due to the emphasis on efficiency, agencification based innovation policy 
implementation model favours outsourcing of programme management and is generally 
highly market friendly as signals from the market are believed to be best policy guide (see 
European Innovation Progress Report, 2006, 65-66). However, many EE countries have seen 
their economies massively restructured during the 1990s that resulted, as we saw above, in 
economic structure oriented towards outsourcing and low value added activities or sectors 
where networking and linkages are naturally very low. Indeed, agencification in these kinds 
of circumstances does not foster networking practices but rather may cause severe problems 
in policy design and implementation as agencies are by definition at arm’s length to 
government offices. Such tendencies tend to cause instability in a system as a side effect (see 
here case studies about the old member states by Pollitt et al., 2004). That is why the issue of 
agencification and in particular in innovation policy has been heavily raised by OECD in one 
of its latest reports (2005).  
 
 20 
Thus, to sum up, while with the introduction of structural funds and through strong influence 
from the European Commission, EE innovation policies are significantly changing since mid-
2000s, there are also serious problems that emerged with this trend. First, as we argued, the 
emerging innovation policies tend to be based on rathe  linear understanding of innovation 
(from lab to market) whereas most EE countries are specialized into low end production 
activities virtually void of any research and with low demand for high skills; in addition, 
R&D system as such has been under constant pressure since the transition and its 
performance has been clearly lacking. Thus, EE innovati n policies tend solve problems not 
existing in the respective economies and in this context the problem of misunderstanding of 
the Soviet R&D and industry in 1990s is replicated to the policy-making model of the 2000s.  
 
Second, through creation of innovation policy implementation/administrative agencies (for 
structural funding and beyond), the innovation policy andscape is fragmented and previous 
problems in policy creation (lack of strategic skills and capacity, networking and coordination 
non-existent) and implementation (competitive grant-based programming that relies on 
market signals without being able to follow set priorit es and goals) are only deepened. One 
can argue that the innovation policies emerging in the process of Europeanization are based 
on the assumption that policy design and implementatio  follow public-private partnership 
model, yet in reality EE countries singularly lack the ability to implement such a model and 
what is more, actual developments in industry seem to suggest that such a model is 
particularly ill-fitted to EE context. Therefore, the 2000s instead of emphasising policy 
capacity as the centre of the innovation policy-making has limited itself to policy transfer with 
attention to mainly administrative capacity. 
 
In addition, there is an essential problem that EE economic and innovation policy making 
ignored throughout 1990s and 2000s in devising policies to deliver economic restructuring 
and growth. Stable macro-economic environment envisioned to enable FDI inflow – in which 
EE were indeed spectacularly successful – also encouraged massive private foreign lending 
(mostly through foreign banks settling into EE markets that borrowed in foreign currency). 
This drove in particular since the mid 2000s consumption and real-estate booms in all EE 
countries. (See, e.g., Fitch, 2007a, 2007b and 2007c; see also Krugman, 2008b in this context) 
Indeed, most EE countries are highly dependent on foreign investments and private borrowing 
and thus they were caught in a macroeconomic dead end with appreciating exchange rates, 
negative current account balances and growing private indebtedness. This led to increased 
financial fragility through deteriorating balance of payments account and left EE countries 
starving for new foreign lending and investments that however stopped in the aftermath of the 
global financial meltdown in 2008. In essence, EE industrial restructuring and innovation 
model became a giant Ponzi scheme. As global, and especially inner-EU demand slows, so do 
EE exports and by early 2009 most EE currencies have seen massive drops in their value and 
foreign investors seem to flee en masse. (See also Fitch, 2009) At the same time, in particular 
Central European countries such as Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic have achieved 
high levels of integration with the EU: merchandising exports in worth of up to 60% of GDP 
goes in these countries to the EU. (IMF DOTS database) Debt deflation looks very likely. 
Fragmented innovation policy scene, inherited from the accession into the EU, paralyses EE 
countries into inaction as there seems to be no seri us policy evaluation capacity present and 
coordination problems prevent quick reaction to radic lly changed environment. 
 
Thus, we can sum up the influence of the EU upon EE innovation systems as follows: 
 
- Much more active role of the state in structural and innovation policies; 
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- Policies concentrate on commercialization and other R&D aspects; high technology 
bias certified; 
- Increasing fragmentation of policy arena through agencies that results in strong 
coordination problems; 
- Growing mismatch between R&D system, high-tech biased innovation policy and 
actual industry needs. 
 
The development of innovation policy capacities canbe viewed in following terms: 
 
- Relatively strong but continuingly peculiar state capacity development as EU inspired 
policies offer legitimacy to new initiatives and policies; 
- Growth of implementation agencies is seemingly enhancing administrative capacity; 
however, this happens at the expense of ever-weakening policy capacity to analyse 
domestic situation and generate policy responses and in fact weakened administrative 
capacity as well; 
- Policy networking, coordination and cooperation were almost completely ignored; 
- Policy capacity and administrative capacity development substitute by market reforms 
as market demand seen as key driver of changes in industry and innovation system. 
 
To sum up, we can draw a table that depicts how innovation policy, capacity and their effects 
evolved in the last two decades in EE economies (Table 4). This table is a snapshot of what 
we mean with copying paradox: EE countries adopt increasingly policies that imitate the 
developed country innovation policies, yet this very p ocess seems to hollow out local policy 
and administrative capacity creation and development. 
 
Table 4. Evolution of innovation policy, capacity and effects in EE, 1990-2009. 
 




No policy policy; FDI and increased 
competition; private sector main R&D 
provider; economic restructuring as 
source of innovation. 
 
Overcoming ‘European paradox’: 
commercialize research; horizontal and 
demand oriented R&D policies. 
Key capacity 
characteristics 
- Relatively strong state capacity as WC 
inspired policies offered legitimacy to 
new initiatives and policies; 
- This was accompanied by weak to 
non-existent policy capacity 
development; EE countries act as 
policy takers and adopt massively 
from WC toolbox; 
- Policy networking, coordination and 
cooperation were almost completely 
ignored; 
- Policy capacity and administrative 
capacity development substituted by 
market reforms - market demand seen 
as key driver of changes in industry 
and innovation system. 
- Relatively strong state capacity 
development as EU inspired policies 
offer legitimacy to new initiatives and 
policies; 
- Growth of implementation agencies is 
seemingly enhancing administrative 
capacity; however, this happens at the 
expense of ever-weakening policy 
capacity to analyse domestic situation 
and generate policy responses and in fact 
weakened administrative capacity as 
well; 
- Policy networking, coordination and 
cooperation were almost completely 
ignored; 
- Policy capacity and administrative 
capacity development substitute by 
market reforms as market demand seen 




Key effects of 
policy 
- Productivity increases through 
slashing liabilities and employment; 
- Replacement of products and 
machinery; 
- Foreign ownership provides key 
access to management and marketing 
know-how and production networks; 
- Modularity and outsourcing in 
production.  
 
- Contract work for European companies; 
- Process innovations prevail through 
cost-cutting initiatives, new machinery; 
- Marketing and brand creation for home 




Thus, it can be argued that there are strong path dependencies how innovation policy evolved 
in EE countries. In the next section we argue that t ese path dependencies originate from the 
particular timing when EE countries re-entered globa  capitalism. 
 
4. Discourse analysis – why the ‘copying paradox’ has persisted? 
 
The previous section of our paper was mainly dealing with the effects level analysis of EE 
innovation policy and its development. In this section we will show how the EE countries 
entered the global capitalism at a distinct time in history where process level debate about 
innovation, development, catching-up and policies reflected a rather particular, even partly 
ideological, movement that was inevitably proposed an taken over by the EE policy 
communities. To follow the line of argumentation of our paper, we will concentrate on the 
parallel trajectories of innovation policy (IP) and public policy and administration (PPA) 
discourses from the transition/developing country pers ective.  
 
From our preceding analysis, we can bring out three claims that we have explicitly or 
implicitly made about the development of the IP trajectory in EE: 
- The 1990s period of innovation policy was inevitably a no-policy policy period 
because of the role of the WC policies; 
- Instead of emphasis on developing policy capacity for a transition state, IP and PPA 
discourses combined resulted in over-emphasis on administrative reforms and 
development that was perceived to positively affect the emergence of policy capacity; 
- Despite the peculiar but noticeable capacity (and legitimacy) of the state in IP and 
development of administrative capacity, the expected policy outcomes have not 
emerged, and de-contextualised policy-making through policy transfer has remained 
the dominant policy mode.  
 
We will now turn to discourse-based analysis to explain why these processes have been an 
inevitable result stemming from the 1990s WC based policies and understanding of the state 
capacity. Note that our explanations and arguments here are developed for the context of IP 
development and we look at these questions from the context of IP. Therefore, our claims are 
contextual. 
 
Why no policy innovation policy in the 1990s, or, why ‘confusion in diffusion’? 
 
In our previous sections we have argued that the EE countries have introduced innovation 
policy proper only during the EU harmonization and accession periods and the 1990s had 
largely been the domain of no-policy innovation policy. This section argues that in fact the 
no-policy policy period together with the WC macroec nomic policy model can be viewed as 
a market forces dependent approach to innovation, catching-up and industrial development, 
and therefore the lack of innovation (and in some cases industrial) policy during the 1990s in 
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EE has been a conscious or inevitable result of the diffusion of the macro-economic 
stabilization policy to the domain of innovation policy. Therefore, we call the period 
‘confusion in diffusion’. 
 
Briefly, it can all be linked universal acceptance of the WC policies as the mode for achieving 
macro-economic stabilization.17 Yet, as has been argued in this paper and elsewher (Tiits et. 
al., 2008; Törok, 2007) the EE countries faced a two level economic policy challenge: macro-
economic stabilization and industrial restructuring on a structural scale. As the WC policies 
where solely concerned with the former, the EE countries faced a policy lacuna due to the 
lack of a model that would accommodate both the needs of the latter challenge and be in line 
with the WC stabilisation policies. The mainstream macro-economic stabilisation policies of 
the time were the WC policies. We will later shortly indicate that at the time there was no 
mainstream approach or concept of industrial or innovation policy for developing countries, at 
least in the policy-making discourse of the time. 
 
Thus, the common vision of the reformers (both local and international) was following a 
rather clear idea that past Soviet legacies (both in policy and in policy-making) where largely 
detrimental and inefficient at achieving fundamental socio-economic turnarounds (classic 
path-dependent presumptions). Therefore, it can be said that the EE started with a clear 
understanding of what was not desirable (e.g., strong le of the past communist state 
institutions) and though we have argued that during that period relatively strong state capacity 
emerged, it was strongly constrained by the WC. This made it inevitably obvious for the 
industrial restructuring to be based on a similar mode of policy thinking, i.e. relying on the 
market forces to sort-out the industrial challenges. This is what we call policy diffusion: the 
spread of the WC policy that is firstly macroeconomic stabilisation policy also to IP 
discourse. 
 
We believe that the uniqueness of the period, more precisely the lack of explicit innovation 
policy discourse for the EE countries comes from the particular moment of time in the 
development of the ‘mainstream’ industrial and innovation policy discourses that could have 
been used as a basis of more conscious policy transfer or policy modelling for the EE 
countries.  
 
We can see that at end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s (see for detailed historical 
account Soete, 2007; for analysis of concept/discourse development, Sharif, 2006) the 
international/Western discourse was facing a rather significant shift in understanding and 
approaching technological and industrial development. Si ce the end of the WWII, the 
cornerstone of the economic policy in Europe had been industrial policy (sectoral policy with 
discernible strategic policy interventions in specific sectors and technologies, including also 
‘picking winners’). This has gradually been developing into innovation policy. During the 
1970s and 1980s there was a shift in emphasis of industrial policy from low-tech to high-tech 
industries. This has been followed by the emergence a d development of innovation policy 
that has moved towards the ‘systems of innovation’ approach and offering more systematic 
policy views by looking together at the innovating firms and their external environment. 
Therefore, this kind of analysis highlights a path-dependent development of the policy 
discourse in more developed European countries.  
 
                                                
17 We have already discussed it in detail and argued that the relevance of the model has had a different impact in 
different regions of the EE (see section 3 and Drahokoupil, 2007), but we still argue that the core of the policy 
thinking and policy analysis had the WC ideas as its base. 
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Thus, the developed world itself was largely facing a huge challenge to rethink policies and 
models for economic growth and technological advance. At least part of it can be put on the 
account of techno-economic paradigm shift (see Perez, 2002; 2007) that brought about new 
policy challenges as modularity in production processes (e.g., possibilities for outsourcing 
etc.) changed the context of growth and development. Above, we have argued that the lack of 
attention to this issue at the developing context has been one of the main policy challenges in 
EE as well. Furthermore, the spread of the WC policies implied that it was against the idea of 
general discourse of the economic restructuring to consider industrial policy (‘picking 
winners’ requires considerable policy capacity) as a policy tool that could be taken from the 
past experience of the developed Western economies (se  also, Radosevic, 2009).   
 
The mid-1980s were witnessing an emergence of an altern tive policy-model of organising 
and managing for technological development, the concept of ‘national innovation systems’ 
(Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) that quickly spread around the academic and 
policy discourse. System of innovation approaches, similar to other closely linked approaches 
– e.g., clusters (Porter, 1998, 2000) – are largely aimed at systemising the different factors 
relevant in the context of innovation. Yet, Sharif (2006) has given thorough account of the 
confusion and ambiguities around the emergence of the concept and its use in policy 
discourse. Furthermore, the approach was largely developed based on the experiences of 
mostly developed countries – e.g., Japan by Freeman (1987), US, Japan, Germany; Britain, 
Korea, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, Australia (Nelson, 1993). The concepts itself is largely 
relying on the Schumpeterian/evolutionary/institutional theories. These approaches are based 
on rather specific presumptions about the characteristics of firms and entrepreneurs (e.g., 
routines, search practices etc.) in the context of innovation and technological development 
that are presumed to differ considerably depending on the level of development (see for 
example, Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
We have already argued above that the innovation policy measures of the EE have lacked the 
ability to tackle the core challenges of the system of innovations. These challenges are 
largely issues that the developed countries had been d aling or accommodating with already 
through industrial policy and the innovation policy as such can be viewed as a redefinition of 
industrial policy through re-prioritization or shift n emphasis, but not a shift in understanding 
what the underlying causes of innovation are. Discus ions over systems of innovation in the 
context of developing countries have only been a much more recent phenomenon (see 
Lundvall et al., 2009).  
 
Thus, the emergence of the period of ‘diffusion in co fusion’ can be explained from the point 
of innovation discourse through several factors: 
 
- Transition process or catching-up of the EE countries was largely foreign-led, i.e. the 
ideas or ‘best-practice’ policy examples came from the Western countries; 
- The general discourse of innovation and development was passing through a rather 
significant transformation and; 
- This created a situation where on the one hand, the discourse was dealing extensively 
with the issues of innovation and innovation policy (as a next level after industrial 
policy), but it did not pay attention to the developing country challenges; 
- The EE countries had a past experience with seemingly inefficient industrial policy 
because of weak state, policy and administrative capa ity; 




Why over-emphasis on a distinct mode of administratve capacity? 
 
We have argued above that the emergence of the attention to innovation policy proper in the 
end of the 1990s has been based on a much more conscious attention to issues of innovation 
and development, though still missing the point of the core challenges. 
 
It can be stated that the beginning of the 1990s was rather similar for the EE countries from 
the perspective of the PPA discourse as well, i.e. s milarly to economic policy, it was all 
about restructuring. The EE countries where facing a double challenge – to create basic 
institutions and to reform the state administration  free it from the ‘shackles’ of communist 
bureaucracy and past inefficiencies (Randma-Liiv, 2009; Agh, 2003; Veheijen, 2003). 
Therefore, the challenge could be interpreted as re-establishing a belief in the state, and 
increasing policy and administrative capacity. It all h d to be done in the context of the 
international discourse development facing ideological and policy turmoil. 
 
Pollitt (2002, 2001), while developing his convergenc  approach, has argued that much of the 
public administration debate has converged around the concept of ‘new public management’ 
denoting a specific model of public administration based on private sector management 
principles (for more detailed accounts, start with Osborne and Gaebler, 1992 and move to 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004 for a detailed overview of the literature and practice; for 
arguments on the narrow neo-liberal ideological background of this model, see Drechsler, 
2005). The NPM movement has filled the public administration and policy arena with 
concepts such as privatisation, quasi-markets, performance management, specialisation, 
delegation, agencification, contracting-out etc. But this convergence around the concept of 
NPM has to be understood as a discursive or talk level convergence because there is a rather 
convincing lack of empirical evidence of the positive mpact of the reforms.  
 
Nevertheless, it has not been limited to the level of talk only, different countries have tried 
and succeeded or failed in introducing different concepts at different rates of speed and scope. 
These ambiguities and differences are largely the reason why there is only emerging empirical 
evidence of the scope of different administrative refo ms being pursued and not comparative 
evidence of the results being achieved.18 In essence, the success of reforms or administrative 
models can only be measured in relation to wider policy r even state goals, such as 
sustainable economic growth. In this context, the famous Evans and Rauch (1999) study 
arguing for the role of Weberian elements (career system and merit based recruitment) has not 
been proven wrong, especially as most of the NPM theorising and policy designs have been 
developed in the context of developed states, while t eir research has been done in the context 
of developing states.  
 
Therefore, the last three decades of administrative dev lopment in Western democracies has 
been characterised by a theoretical and ideological battle between institutional, organisational 
and sociological theories and approaches that have ighlighted the specificity of the public 
sphere and the theories from mainstream economics (public choice models etc.) that have 
argued against the specificity of the public sector (f r classics see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; 
                                                
18 In addition, the research in the context of European countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Drechsler, 2005) 
has limited the viability of concept of NPM to only Anglo-Saxon countries and offered a more European 
(contextually more suited to the European scene) model r approach – the Neo-Weberian State – that has a 
central emphasis on maintaining the Weberian-type policy capacity that can be only supplemented by increasing 
administrative capacity through private sector management techniques.  
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Mintzberg, 1996; for empirics, start again with Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Because of the 
dominance of the neoclassical economics in the discussions of the content of economic policy 
(at least as prescribed for the EE countries), it has also been easier to legitimise (on the 
discursive level) administrative theories and approaches based on similar theoretical 
assumptions in the public administration and policy discourse – Reagan and Thatcher are 
highlighted as the most influential public persons developing the debates both in economic 
policy and public administration reforms (see, e.g., Williamson, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004). This argument has been explicitly pronounced also in the context of the EE countries, 
especially as it is line with both theoretical and ideological premises of the WC. 
 
In principle, there can be a similar argument made from two sides. The WC economic policies 
were particularly market-friendly and argued that the EE governments should contract and 
give as much as possible for the markets forces to sort out. The NPM movement was based on 
the public choice school of taught that, on the one hand, prescribed policies that’s content was 
based on the primacy of the market (e.g., limited role for the government in the spheres where 
market does function), and on the other hand, prescribed managerial principles based on the 
same private sector management techniques. Therefor, it is rather obvious that these 
discourses have the theoretical arguments to support each other’s claims and to offer remedies 
for each other in policy-making and implementation. 
 
In the innovation policy context, we have argued that e no-policy policy period was 
followed by rather explicit increase in the role of the government and the state, though as 
providing only incentives for the market forces to sort out policy challenges. We have also 
highlighted that the governmental interventions, as prescribed by the EU, where largely based 
on the idea of creating new ‘legacy-free’ administrative agents for implementing innovation 
policy. The core argument behind the idea can be seen o that the problem with current 
administrative structure was its path-dependent ineffici ncy (e.g., ministries were part of the 
old system) that could have been solved through agents independent both from past legacies 
and political intervention (for general theoretical argumentation of agencification, see for 
example Christensen and Laegreid, 2006; Pollitt et al., 2004). In essence, the ideal-type model 
was based on the presumption that increase of autonomy of the agents will be accompanied 
by the increase in control and regulation by the principals to sustain policy 
comprehensiveness and accountability.   
 
Yet in the context of the EE, it can be argued thate NPM movement, and its concepts such 
as agencification, has largely been taken out of the context where the main challenge has been 
to first and for most to increase the efficiency of the public management system, to the 
context where the primary concerns has been to create or increase the effectiveness of the 
government and the state. In our analytical distinctio , the issues and medicines for increasing 
administrative capacity have been largely equated to the issues and remedis for increasing 
policy and state capacity. But this can be seen as looking at fundamentally contradictory 
goals with the same glasses – managerial efficiency a d effectiveness is about organising and 
managing resources necessary for policy implementatio  (in essence, cost-efficiency); policy 
efficiency and effectiveness is about creating and maintaining capacities necessary for 
designing proper policies (in essence, investments for future).  
 
The critique of NPM has always included a portion of emphasis on the fact that even if 
increasing the managerial efficiency is achieved, it can be accompanied by loss of existing 
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policy capacity or ability to create new policy capacities required in changing 
circumstances.19  
 
Why innovation policy is still ‘lost in transfer’? 
 
We have argued that in the context of the EE countries and their innovation policy 
development, the period of ‘confusion in diffusion’ has been followed by an explicit emphasis 
on innovation policy that has been based on firstly, misunderstanding the problems of 
innovation in EE, and secondly, misinterpreting the policy problem as merely managerial 
issue. As the 1990s of the EE have been infused with the public choice based discourse both 
in terms of the content of innovation policy and context of innovation policy making and 
implementation, the influence of the EU in the end of the 1990s was largely based upon the 
same policy context: the EE countries had lacked cons i us emphasis on developing policy 
analysis and policy development skills and because of lack of innovation policy proper, these 
capacities and skills had not had any incentive to merge in process or unconsciously. 
Therefore, the conscious attempts at innovation policy development have been also foreign-
led, more specifically based on the ideas and models proposed by the EU. Thus, the 
development of innovation policy for EE has largely been based on the discourse of the 
innovation policy that limits the due attention that s to be paid to the contextual 
characteristics of the EE. And these have been lost in the context of policy transfer. 
 
The recent ‘stock-taking’ on innovation policy development by OECD (Box, 2009, 2) 
summarises the development of the innovation policy d scourse as follows: 
 
The stocktaking highlights that much work, both theoretical and empirical, has already been 
done to identify the policies, institutions and framework conditions that can provide the most 
effective means of supporting innovation. However, evaluation of specific government support 
policies and their impacts on innovation is generally sparse and there is a need for more and 
better evidence on the costs and benefits of government support for innovation. 
 
Therefore, the current discourse lacks evidence of the results convergence; that is, there is no 
clear-cut evidence of the best policy, even in the context of developed countries. As the same 
assessment further highlights (Box, 2009, 14-16) the systems of innovations approach 
provides a generalised model for assessing innovation policies in different systems. The 
policy mix to solve the challenges of the system has to be mostly context-dependent because 
‘ there are major national differences in comparative and competitive advantages, implying 
potentially different patterns of response to similar policy instruments’ . Therefore, we can 
also conclude that despite discursive and formal decisional convergence in innovation police 
debates, we can not presume and also lack in-depth evidence that there is convergence in 
actions, i.e. that generic policy measures that seem to have similar labels in different countries 
carry identical content across contexts. Rather, the seems to be more weight to the argument 
that universalistic policy discourse and formal decisions are facing contextual feasibility and 
desirability challenges once implemented in specific systems, countries.  
 
Therefore, we believe that herein lays the problem why the assessment of EE innovation 
policy mixes that we have discussed and elaborated in section 3 has emerged. Innovation 
policy proper arrived at the policy-making arena only i  the end of the 1990s by which the 
WC based economic policy and NPM dominated administrat ve reform model (e.g., 
                                                
19 For a great theoretical and conceptual analysis in context of agencification and its impact on specialisation and 
coordination and the eternal dilemmas between these contrasting ideas, see Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005. 
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increasing managerial efficiency before policy effectiveness had been created and then 
secured) had created a discernable path of state’s rol  in economic development and policies 
that by most accounts misinterpreted the situation. F r example, Tiits et al. (2008) have 
argued that in terms of policy impact in economic policy (e.g., increasing the competitiveness 
of the countries), the 1990s has been a “lost decade” because the catching-up effect presumed 
to take effect in the transition processes has not realised, and the CEE countries are actually 
falling behind the industrialised economies. Further, they argue (ibid.: 81) that EE ‘countries 
mistook initial and continuing rapid growth for a response to their development policies. In 
reality, large parts of the success are attributable to two factors: techno-economic paradigm 
change and globalization with liberalization of markets’ . 
 
Therefore, the innovation policy development since the late 1990s was based on the 
presumption that chosen policies and paths had been th  cause of the success in terms of 
economic growth and that growth represented a proof of sustainable economic restructuring. 
This means that, although we could witness a considerable shift in the EE discourse over 
innovation policy (from no-policy policy to explicit public policy) it was still just an 
incremental change (or cyclical alternation) in the initial policy path because the problems of 
innovation where seen as merely market-failure problems that can be solved by ‘non-too-
interventionist’ policy measures (horizontal innovation policy measures) and policy problems 
where seen more as administrative capacity problems than policy capacity challenges. This in 
our view and analysis has created a situation where innovation policy measures have been 
transferred to the EE countries without a comprehensiv  policy analysis capacity to truly 
assess the suitability and theoretical validity. In this context, policy analysis is mostly dealing 
with analysis of the administrative capacity for implementing ideal-type models designed 
from other context (‘feasibility studies’) and not as much with analysis of the suitability and 
contextual applicability of the ideal-models (‘desirability studies’). The issue of policy 
capacity has hardly been at the centre of discussion  in the context of innovation policy 
development and implementation already since the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
Thus, the ‘lost in transfer’ period can be summarised into several discernible developments: 
 
- External economic forces created a misconception abut the impact of chosen WC 
path on the economic restructuring and sustainability of growth; 
- The emerging innovation policy proper represents only a partial shift within the larger 
WC trajectory of policy-making; 
- International administrative reform discourse has limited the emphasis to 
administrative capacity and managerial efficiency, disregarding the interconnections 
with policy capacity; 
- The resulting policy and administrative capacity is largely de-contextualised and 




In our paper we have followed the development of the trajectory of the innovation policy in 
EE since the beginning of the 1990s and we have argued that it has been, since its emergence 
as a no-policy policy in the 1990s, a path-dependent process with changes that at first are 
seemingly fundamental (the changes in 2000s induced by the harmonization process and the 
EU policy models) are, if looked in more detail, repr sentations of cycles/alternations within 
the limits set by the initial starting point and understanding of the policy challenge. 
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We have argued that within the innovation policy development we can witness 
misunderstandings or misconceptions both from the perspective of IP discourse and from the 
perspective of PPA discourse.  
 
Based on the former, the initial mistake of the 1990s was to misunderstand the nature of 
Soviet R&D systems and industry – in the perspectiv of two decades and more this can be 
seen as the critical juncture that re-defined the rol  of the state in industrial and innovation 
policy from over-involvement of the Soviet era to explicitly market-led and -dominated policy 
models. We have argued that this was mainly caused by the peculiar state capacity definition 
and state legitimacy that was brought about by the wid r WC policy toolbox and that diffused 
into the innovation policy arena. Later in the 2000s, the same mistake/misconception was 
redefined into the ‘European paradox’ that was followed by the policy-transfer from the EU 
toolbox.  
 
Based on the latter discourse, by end of the no-policy policy that was triggered by the external 
forces such as the EU, the innovation policy problem was seen as an administrative capacity 
problem that was to be solved by administrative reform. Yet, we have shown that all of this 
has resulted in non-emergence of policy capacity that would seem to be pivotal for contextual 
analysis of feasible and desirable policies. To date, the feasibility and desirability of the role 
of public policies in innovation has been constrained by the initial WC ideas e.g., even if the 
EU toolbox, compared to the WC, has increased the legitimacy of state intervention in this 
policy area, it is still largely based on the primacy of the market-forces (policies are horizontal 
and implemented through market principles such as competition). Therefore, the changes of 
innovation policy in the end of the 1990s and 2000s, both in the content and context of 
innovation policy trajectories have largely been cycles or alternations in the initial policy 
mode. 
 
This is summarized in Graph 1. The vertical axis reflects a continuum of definition of state 
capacity, e.g. capacity defined through market forces indicates that the market is a more 
effective decision tool over the content and context of policies; capacity defined through the 
scope of the public policies indicates the opposite or that the market-forces face significant 
challenges in creating optimum solutions and the state can either create additional incentives 
from the market-forces or act instead of the market forces. By definition, the latter would 
presume stronger and more developed policy and administrative capacity. The horizontal axis 
is essentially ‘time’ perspective from the beginning of the 1990s (WC) until 2000s (EU), but 
also reflective of the two analytical/ideal types of p licies – the WC policies and the EU 
policies – and the description of the emergence of these policies (e.g. from diffusion in 
confusion to lost in transfer). The dotted diagonal lines indicate the constraints of the policies 
created by the WC – e.g., despite witnessing an increase in government/public policies, we 
can still argue that these policies (horizontal policy measures, for example) are still closer to 
market-based approaches as opposed to other more state-interventionist policies (setting 
sectoral preferences and measures etc.). In addition, the graph contains indicative lines of 
development of the innovation policy trajectory and respective capacities to graphically 
illustrate the contradictions in policy development.   
 
Graph 1. The path-dependency of the innovation policy development trajectory in EE, within 
the limits of the WC created policy feasibility and desirability constraints, and the indicative 
impact on the emergence and development of different capacities.20 
                                                






Therefore, the EE countries have been largely moving towards de-contextualisation of policy 
making and have followed a trajectory of development that has made it increasingly difficult 
to firstly, realise the need for fundamental changes, and secondly, to have capacity to carry 
these changes through. Thus we can track the emergence of a peculiar mode of state capacity 
that paradoxically or actually characteristically for ex-Soviet countries over-estimates the 
power of market forces in the context of economic restructuring, technological development 
and innovation (‘creative destruction’) and creates what we call the ‘copying paradox’.  
 
Therefore, we are also witnessing a modest or even significantly decreasing policy capacity in 
these countries that does not seem to have been an issue of importance throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s. As a result, the only recognisable level of reform and development seems to be 
administrative capacity. But this has resulted in almost extreme complexity: fragmentation of 
policy measures and implementations means that are det imental for any policy capacity 
emergence. Therefore, over the last two decades the EE countries have misinterpreted their 
problems, misread their development, and misunderstood the international policy arenas from 
where they are copying policy ideas. The innovation p licy of the EE countries has been 
playing with the fire by constantly moving closer to locking itself into the worst possible 
policy modes – implementing ‘wrong things’ badly/, or even worse, implementing ‘wrong 
things’ well. Paradoxically, the ‘wrong thing’ may just be overestimation of the level of 
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